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Abstract 
This article examines the impact of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on host countries’ 
domestic investment. Utilizing data from 50 countries over the period of 1970 to 2004, we find that 
inward FDI has a negative contemporaneous effect on domestic investment, while the cumulative 
effect of FDI over time tends to be positive. In addition, we separately study FDI in Developed 
Countries (DCs) and Less Developed Countries (LDCs). The effect of contemporaneous FDI on domestic 
investment is negative in DCs, and the cumulative effect of FDI is neutral. Strong evidence suggests 
that the contemporaneous effect of FDI on domestic investment is neutral in LDCs, while the 
cumulative effect of FDI is positive. 
I. Introduction 
During the past few decades, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
has become the core of international economic activity. As shown in Table 1, world FDI inflows were 
$735 billion in 2001, compared to $203 billion in 1990 (United Nations, 2002). The annual average 
growth rate of world FDI inflows during the second half of the 1990s was 40.1%, up from 23.6% during 
the second half of the 1980s. In the past few decades, the growth of FDI flows in many countries has 
exceeded the growth of their exports and imports. Naturally, impacts of FDI in the host country have 
captured the attention of both academic researchers and policy makers. 
Table 1. World FDI flows, 1982–2001 
  Value at current prices (billions of 
US dollars) 
  Annual growth 
rate (%) 
  
  1982 1990 2001 1986–1990 1991–
1995 
1996–
2000 
FDI inflows 59 203 735 23.6 20.0 40.1 
FDI 
outflows 
28 233 621 24.3 15.8 36.7 
Source: United Nations (2002). 
 
Theoretically, FDI is considered to transfer not only physical capital but also intangible assets such as 
better technology or management skills. While many researchers have studied the impact of inward 
FDI in terms of economic growth and domestic productivity in the host country (Kokko, 1992; 
Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Borensztein et al., 1998; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Hejazi and 
Safarian, 1999; Hubert and Pain, 2001; Chakraborty and Basu, 2002; Choi, 2004; Blonigen and 
Wang, 2005; Wang and Yu, 2007), few economists have addressed a related issue–the impact of 
inward FDI on domestic investment. 
In this study, we attempt to answer the following question: To what extent does inward FDI affect 
domestic investment in the host country? If inward FDI decreases the amount of domestic investment, 
we call this crowding-out, while crowding-in occurs when inward FDI encourages domestic investment 
in the host country.1 On the one hand, FDI can crowd out the host country's domestic investment if 
MNCs, because of their efficiencies, simply replace domestic firms. Crowding-out can also occur if 
MNCs finance their investment by borrowing in the host country, which would increase the host 
country's interest rate (Harrison and McMillan, 2003). On the other hand, crowding-in can happen if 
FDI stimulates backward or forward production linkages in the host country (Markusen and 
Venables, 1999). For example, if the entry of MNCs in the final product industry increases the demand 
for domestically produced intermediate inputs, we could observe an increase in the number of 
domestic firms providing intermediate inputs. Crowding-in can also occur due to the spillover effects of 
FDI. This happens when foreign firms’ more advanced technology spills over to domestic firms, 
enhancing their competitiveness. 
As inward FDI theoretically is considered to bring in better technology and contribute to economic 
growth, many governments, especially governments of Less Developed Countries (LDCs), are willing to 
provide preferential policies toward inward FDI. However, if FDI crowds out domestic investment, 
there can be long-term costs to the host country, including restraining the development of domestic 
capabilities and delaying the growth of local firms. If severe enough, inward FDI can reduce, rather 
than increase, the host country's economic growth. Therefore, it is very important for us to understand 
the actual impact of inward FDI on domestic investment in the host country. 
Among researchers investigating the empirical relationship between FDI and host countries’ domestic 
investment, Van Loo (1977) finds a neutral or crowding-out effect of FDI on domestic investment in 
Canada. In another study, Driffield and Munday (1998) argue that foreign investment in the United 
Kingdom increases competition in the product market and decreases the profitability of domestic 
firms. On the other hand, Borensztein et al. (1998), using data from 69 LDCs from 1970 to 1989, find 
that total investment increases 1.5–2.3 times the increase in FDI, though such a positive effect is not 
robust to different model specifications. Agrawal (2000) explores the relationship between FDI and 
domestic investment in five South Asian countries during the period of 1965 to 1996 and finds 
complementarity between FDI and the nationally owned investment. Similarly, Ang (2008) also 
concludes that FDI is complementary to private domestic investment in Malaysia over the period of 
1960 to 2003 (see also Agosin and Mayer, 2000). 
In our article, we use data from 50 countries over the period of 1970 to 2004 to explore the effect of 
FDI on host countries’ domestic investment. Our study contributes to the existing literature in two 
respects. First, ours is a multi-country study and, more importantly, we separately examine the 
crowding-in/out hypothesis for Developed Countries (DCs) and LDCs. Previous papers that concentrate 
on single-economy analysis are country-specific and the results might be difficult to generalize. Other 
multi-country studies typically do not compare crowding-in/out effects in DCs and LDCs. As Blonigen 
and Wang (2005) argue, the nature and volume of inward FDI are quite different in DCs and LDCs, and 
FDI tends to have different effects in these two categories of countries. Second, we look at not only the 
contemporaneous effect of FDI, but also the effect of lagged FDI on the host country's domestic 
investment. We find that contemporaneous FDI crowds out domestic investment in DCs, but has a 
neutral effect in LDCs. The cumulative effect FDI (total effect of contemporaneous and lagged FDI) is 
positive in LDCs, while the cumulative effect of FDI is neutral on the domestic investment in DCs. 
Our article proceeds as follows: Section II provides theoretical background for our study. Section 
III presents the empirical specification and data. Econometric results are analysed in Section IV, 
and Section V concludes. 
II. Theoretical Background 
In an influential study, Markusen and Venables (1999) theorize the relationship between MNCs and 
domestic firms. The study emphasizes that the entry of MNCs creates two effects in the host country, a 
competition effect and a linkage effect. The competition effect states that the entry of MNCs increases 
competition in the final product industry and reduces the profitability of domestic firms in the same 
industry. This, in turn, causes domestic firms to exit. However, at the same time, the entry of MNCs 
could cause the demand for domestic production of intermediate inputs to rise. This possibly can lead 
to an increased number of domestic firms in the intermediate inputs industry. Taking into 
consideration both the competition and linkage effects, Markusen and Venables (1999) argue that the 
net effect of entry of MNCs on domestic firms is uncertain. Another recent theoretical study by 
Barrios et al. (2005) echoes the results in Markusen and Venables (1999), and expands the previous 
model by allowing for the coexistence of MNCs and domestic firms in the same industries in the host 
country.2 Based on the concepts of competition and linkage effects, Barrios et al. (2005) illustrate that, 
as the number of MNCs increases in the host country, the number of domestic firms might drop first 
and then rise. The authors assume that MNCs enter the downstream (final product) industry. They 
point out that an increase in the total number of firms (both foreign and domestic) in the downstream 
industry will decrease the price level for the final product. This can reduce the profit for all firms and 
force some domestic firms to exit, given that MNCs are more productive than domestic firms. 
However, the possible linkage effect can increase the number of upstream domestic firms and then 
reduce the cost of production in the downstream industry for both MNCs and domestic firms. 
Consequently, the number of domestic firms in the host country will eventually go up. In the Appendix, 
we provide a theoretical model following closely Barrios et al. (2005) to illustrate the above-mentioned 
relationship between the number of MNCs and the number of domestic firms. 
III. Empirical Specification and Data 
Ideally, we would like to obtain information on the number of multinational firms and the number of 
domestic firms in all host countries across the sample period, or data on plant-level production and 
investment. Such micro-level data are typically recorded with precision. However, harmonized micro-
level data are extremely difficult to collect on a multi-country basis, especially in LDCs. Therefore, we 
use aggregate domestic investment as a proxy for the number of domestic firms, and inward FDI as a 
proxy for the number of MNCs in our empirical estimation.3 These macro-level data are much more 
readily available. In addition, such macro-data allow us to conduct a cross-country comparison, and our 
results will be more comparable to previous empirical studies. Consequently, we utilize the following 
basic formulation: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where i and t are country and time subscripts, respectively; Investment represents the domestic 
investment in the host country; FDI is the inward FDI in the host country; Z is a vector of control 
variables and εit is a stochastic error term. 
Based on the micro foundation summarized in the previous section, as we use aggregate data at the 
macro-level, we further specify a regression equation as follows with the expected signs for individual 
coefficients: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =   β0  + (? )β1  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  β2 (+)  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑖𝑖  , 𝐼𝐼 − 1 + β3 (−)  𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  β4 (−)  𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + β5 (? )  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  β6  (? )𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
+ β7 (? )  𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Investment is measured as the ratio of domestic investment to GDP in the host country, where 
domestic investment is calculated as the difference between Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) and 
inward FDI (United Nations, 1999). GFCF measures the total investment in a country. 
FDI is measured as FDI inflows as a share of the host country's GDP. If the coefficient on FDI is positive 
and significant (β 1 > 0), then an increase in FDI leads to crowding-in with respect to domestic 
investment. If the estimated coefficient on FDI is significantly negative (β 1 < 0), then an increase 
in FDI is associated with a decrease in the host country's domestic investment, or a crowding-out 
effect.4 If the estimated coefficient on FDI is not significantly different from zero, it suggests a neutral 
effect of FDI on domestic investment. 
We include other control variables commonly used in previous studies (Borensztein et al., 1998; 
Agrawal, 2000). Growth represents the annual economic growth rate of the host country, measured as 
the log difference of per capita real GDP. There might be a potential endogeneity problem if we include 
the contemporaneous growth in the regression. For instance, a country with faster economic growth 
rate tends to invest more and a country with large investment may also grow faster. To avoid this 
problem, we use a one-period lag of Growth (Growtht −1) in the regression instead of the current 
economic growth rate. We expect per capita real GDP growth to have a positive impact on the host 
country's domestic investment. Lending Rate is the lending rate in the host country.5 It enters the 
regression as a cost of investment. A higher lending rate means a higher cost of investment and we 
expect the lending rate to have a negative coefficient. Volatility is defined as the coefficient of 
variation of inflation in the host country between period t − 2 and period t.6 The larger is the 
coefficient of variation, the greater is the volatility experienced by the host country. Similar measures 
of volatility can be found in Serven and Solimano (1993) and Larrain and Vergara (1993).). The more 
volatile the economy, the less confident the firms are (due to uncertainty). We would expect to see a 
fall in domestic investment with a greater amount of volatility in the economy. 
Inflation is the annual inflation rate in the host country, measured as the log difference of the 
consumer price index. Literature suggests that more competition from foreign firms tends to lead to a 
lower inflation rate in a country (Guerrieri et al., 2008). As a result, inflation can serve as a proxy for 
the competition measure in the host country. On the other hand, inflation can also represent a lower 
real return on investment. The competition effect indicates that inflation will have a positive 
coefficient, while the real return argument suggests that inflation will have a negative coefficient. 
Consequently, we do not have an a priori expectation on the variable of inflation. Exchange 
Raterepresents the real exchange rate in the form of the host country's local currency per US dollar. 
Buffie (1986) notes that a currency depreciation causes the investment in tradable products to 
decrease, but leads to a rise of investment in the nontradable sector. In addition, a depreciation of the 
local currency raises the foreign debt burden of domestic firms, making it harder for them to invest. 
Therefore, the net effect of the real exchange rate on investment is uncertain. The last term, Trend, is a 
time trend used to catch other secular changes. 
Our sample consists of annual data for 50 countries. A list of countries included in the study is provided 
in the Appendix. The data set is unbalanced, covering the period of 1970–2004 whenever possible. 
Data used in our analysis are obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS), published by the 
International Monetary Fund, and World Development Indicators (WDI), published by the World Bank. 
IV. Empirical Results 
Whole-sample results 
Table 2 reports results from the random effects estimation, fixed effects estimation and Arellano-bond 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. We apply the Breusch–Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test and its results indicate that panel estimators (random and fixed effects) are preferred to 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Therefore, OLS results are not reported in our article, but they are 
available upon request. 
Table 2. Impact of FDI on domestic investment 
Independent variable Random effects 
2.1 
 Fixed effects 
2.2 
 GMM 2.3  
FDI −0.697*** (0.055) −0.713*** (0.054) −0.606*** (0.079) 
Growth 0.454*** (0.068) 0.431*** (0.067) 0.409*** (0.034) 
Lending Rate 0.001 (0.005) 0.0005 (0.005) −0.0008 (0.004) 
Volatility −0.090 (0.112) −0.174* (0.101) −0.146** (0.064) 
Inflation −0.018* (0.010) −0.014 (0.010) −0.007 (0.005) 
Exchange Rate 0.0001*** (0.00004) 0.0001** (0.00005) −0.00001 (0.00006) 
Trend −0.181*** (0.016) −0.179*** (0.016) −0.054** (0.023) 
Number of 
observations 
1041  1041  911  
R 2 0.189  0.183      
Notes: SEs are in parentheses. Dependent variable: domestic investment as a share of GDP. 
***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
The first two columns in Table 2 present estimated coefficients from random and fixed effects 
estimations. All independent variables are taken as exogenous in these two regressions. Arellano-bond 
GMM results are reported in regression 2.3. The GMM estimator is developed for dynamic panel data; 
it estimates coefficients using lagged dependent variables, lagged predetermined variables (variables 
which are not exogenous) and differences of exogenous variables. In addition, the GMM controls for 
time and country fixed effects. For the GMM estimator to provide reliable results, it has to both pass 
the Sargen test of over-identifying restriction and show that there is no second-order autocorrelation 
in the residuals. In our case, the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restrictions for Sargen test 
cannot be rejected. Furthermore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no second-order 
autocorrelation in the regression residuals. Therefore, the results from the GMM estimation are 
reliable. 
As shown in Table 2, random effects, fixed effects and the GMM estimation all provide similar results. 
Per capita real GDP growth positively affects the host country's domestic investment. If the economic 
growth rate goes up by 1%, domestic investment as a share of GDP increases by 0.4%, holding other 
things constant. The lending rate does not have the expected sign in the first two regressions, but the 
coefficients are not significant at conventional levels. Volatility has the expected negative coefficient 
and is significant in the fixed effects and GMM estimations. The coefficient on inflation is negative, but 
significant only in the random effects regression. 
The estimated coefficient on our main variable of interest, FDI, is negative and significant at the 1% 
level in all regressions. The magnitude of the coefficient on FDI ranges from −0.606 in the GMM 
estimation to −0.713 in the fixed effects estimation. These results suggest that contemporaneous FDI 
crowds out domestic investment. For example, the GMM estimates indicate that a 1% increase in 
inward FDI as a share of GDP is associated with a 0.606% decrease in domestic investment as a share of 
GDP in the host country, holding other things constant. Using the sample average of FDI of 1.98%, this 
means that the absence of inward FDI will lead to an increase of domestic investment as a share of 
GDP by 1.199% (1.98 * 0.606 = 1.199), ceteris paribus. This result possibly reflects the competition 
effect described previously. In other words, the entry of MNCs generates more competition in the 
product market, decreasing the profit margin for domestic firms. In turn, some domestic firms are not 
able to compete with the MNCs and have to exit the market. 
The effect of lagged FDI and IV estimation 
Quite often, the impact of inward FDI in period t may only partially show in the current period, and last 
into periods t + 1, t + 2, etc. For example, the linkage effects may take a few periods to occur. To catch 
such linkage effects, as well as other possible spillover effects of FDI which could affect domestic 
investment, we include lagged FDI in the regression. At the same time, inward FDI is taken as 
endogenous instead of strictly exogenous. The Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects estimation 
is preferred to the random effects estimation. Therefore, we adopt the Instrumental Variables (IV) 
fixed effects estimation and the results are reported in Table 3. Our instruments for FDI include lagged 
FDI, the number of income/investment tax treaties signed by the host country, the land area of the 
host country, the lagged economic growth and the openness of the host country. Bilateral tax treaties 
that agree to reduce income tax could possibly encourage the entry of MNCs or more inward FDI. 
Relevant information on tax treaties is obtained from Diamond and Diamond (1997). A large land area 
suggests a relatively large domestic market. Given that many MNCs are seeking large markets, we 
expect a large area is associated with more inward FDI. Data on land area come from Frankel and 
Romer (1999). Generally, a country open to trade is also likely to be open to inward FDI. Openness is 
measured as the sum of imports and exports divided by the host country's GDP and is obtained from 
the WDI. The regression of FDI on its instruments has an F-statistic of 264, which indicates the 
instruments are reliable.7 
Table 3. Impact of FDI on domestic investment (IV estimation) 
  Whol
e 
sampl
e 
   DCs    LDCs    
Indepe
ndent 
variabl
e 
Regre
ssion 
3.1 
 Cumu
lative 
effect 
 Regre
ssion 
3.2 
 Cumu
lative 
effect 
 Regre
ssion 
3.3 
 Cumu
lative 
effect 
 
FDI −0.30
2*** 
(0.11
1) 
    −0.71
9*** 
(0.1
31) 
    0.204 (0.1
97) 
    
FDI t−1 0.187 (0.13
4) 
−0.11
5 
(−0.
814) 
0.220 (0.1
81) 
−0.49
9*** 
(−2.
664) 
0.279 (0.2
16) 
0.482*
* 
(2.0
91) 
FDI t−2 0.343
** 
(0.14
5) 
0.228 (1.4
97) 
0.558
*** 
(0.2
01) 
0.059 (0.2
99) 
0.285 (0.2
20) 
0.767*
** 
(2.9
18) 
FDI t−3 0.095 (0.13
9) 
0.323*
* 
(2.2
24) 
−0.28
9 
(0.2
07) 
−0.22
9 
(−1.
303) 
0.349
* 
(0.2
10) 
1.116*
** 
(3.9
91) 
Growth 0.542
*** 
(0.07
9) 
    0.504
*** 
(0.1
17) 
    0.635
*** 
(0.1
22) 
    
Lending 
Rate 
0.003 (0.00
4) 
    0.006 (0.0
11) 
    0.005 (0.0
07) 
    
Volatilit
y 
−0.26
8** 
(0.11
4) 
    −0.08
1 
(0.1
56) 
    −0.38
4** 
(0.1
68) 
    
Inflatio
n 
−0.03
** 
(0.01
3) 
    −0.00
8 
(0.0
17) 
    −0.04
7** 
(0.0
21) 
    
Exchan
ge Rate 
0.000
1 
(0.00
009) 
    0.000
07 
(0.0
002) 
    0.000
3 
(0.0
008) 
    
Trend −0.30
3*** 
(0.02
2) 
    −0.28
3*** 
(0.0
25) 
    −0.34
6*** 
(0.0
46) 
    
Number 
of 
observa
tions 
866      493      361      
R 2         0.178  F(1, 
457) = 
1.7 
     F(1, 
329) = 
15.93 
 
  0.179          Prob. 
> F = 
0.1973 
 0.281  Prob. 
> F = 
0.0001 
 
Notes: For regressions, SEs are in parentheses. For cumulative effect of FDI, t-statistics are in parentheses. Dependent 
variable: domestic investment as a share of GDP. 
***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Regression 3.1 in Table 3 represents the results from the IV estimation for the whole sample. As we can 
see, contemporaneous FDI again has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that 
contemporaneous FDI crowds out domestic investment. Lagged FDI variables (FDI t− 1, FDI t− 2, FDI t− 3) 
have positive coefficients, suggesting a possible crowding-in effect. The estimated coefficients 
on FDI t− 1 and FDI t− 3 are positive but not significant at conventional levels. The strongest crowding-in 
effect occurs 2 years after the initial investment. The estimated coefficient on FDI t− 2 is 0.343 and 
significant at the 5% level. This shows that FDI may contemporaneously crowd out domestic 
investment, but over time, the effect of inward FDI on domestic investment could be positive. 
More detailed or disaggregated data are required to detect the exact mechanisms of the crowding-
in/out effect. A possible explanation for our results is that if the host country already has a sufficient 
level of domestic investment, MNCs will tend to replace domestic firms due to stronger competition. 
However, as different types of production linkages are generated over time, domestic investment 
would increase in upstream industries (through the backward linkage) or downstream industries 
(through the forward linkage).8  The positive effect of FDI on domestic investment can also come from 
the fact that MNCs can hire and train local workers, thereby increasing domestic labour productivity. In 
turn, more domestic firms will enter the market. For instance, the Korean Daewoo International 
Corporation built a textile establishment in Bangladesh in 1979 and trained 130 Bangladeshi workers in 
Korea. Eventually, 115 of these Bangladeshi workers left the original Korean factory to set up their own 
garment plants in Bangladesh and succeeded (Alfaro et al., 2004).9 
Cumulative effect of FDI 
In addition to focusing on individual coefficients, we study the sum of the point estimates of 
coefficients on all FDI variables. This helps us to understand the cumulative effect of inward FDI on the 
host country's domestic investment. We provide the sum of coefficients with t-statistic in parentheses 
for the whole sample in the second column in Table 3.10 For example, the sum of estimated coefficients 
on contemporaneous FDI and one year lag of FDI (FDI t− 1) is −0.302 + 0.187 = −0.115. Given our sample 
size, −0.115 is not significantly different from zero, as shown by the t-statistic of −0.814. This 
represents a change from a crowding-out effect to a neutral effect of inward FDI over time. The sum of 
estimated coefficients on FDI t , FDI t− 1, FDI t− 2 and FDI t− 3 is 0.323, which is positive and significant at the 
5% level. This number indicates that a 1% increase in FDI as a share of GDP leads to an increase of 
0.323% in domestic investment as a share of GDP over 4 years. The result suggests a cumulative 
crowding-in effect of inward FDI on domestic investment in the whole sample. 
Different contemporaneous and cumulative effects in DCs and LDCs 
Another interesting question should be addressed–does inward FDI have the same effects on domestic 
investment in DCs and LDCs? Blonigen and Wang (2005) point out that inward FDI in DCs and LDCs is 
quite different in nature and in volume, and is very likely to have different impacts. Pooling data from 
DCs and LDCs might disguise the true effects of inward FDI in these two groups of countries. To explore 
this issue, we apply sub-sample regressions for DCs, represented by Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries and LDCs, represented by non-OECD countries.11 
Generally speaking, LDCs might not have a sufficient level of domestic investment. As a result, we 
expect that MNCs’ entry occurs more often in sectors that are different from the ones occupied by 
domestic firms in LDCs. In other words, without foreign investment, it is unlikely that the investments 
will be made by domestic firms in LDCs at all. For example, in the 1990s, Intel built a microprocessor 
plant in Costa Rica, which did not replace any local firms in Costa Rica because there were no local 
firms in that industry. Similarly, we also expect the linkage effect and the spillover effect of FDI to be 
more evident in LDCs (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Therefore, a stronger crowding-in effect of 
inward FDI could occur in LDCs than in DCs. 
Results for sub-sample regressions are reported by regressions 3.2 and 3.3 in Table 3. Regression 3.2 
shows that in DCs, the inward FDI has a negative and significant coefficient (−0.719), which indicates a 
significant contemporaneous crowding-out effect. In 3 years, the cumulative effect of FDI on domestic 
investment becomes 0.059 with a t-statistic of 0.299, which is not significant at conventional levels. 
The cumulative effect of inward FDI over a 4-year period is −0.229, but again not significantly different 
from zero. This suggests that for DCs, although contemporaneous inward FDI crowds out domestic 
investment, the magnitude of the possible linkage and spillover effects over time overcomes the initial 
competition effect. The cumulative effect of FDI on domestic investment in DCs is neutral. 
For LDCs, the coefficient on contemporaneous FDI is 0.204, not significantly different from zero. This 
represents a neutral effect of current period FDI on domestic investment. The cumulative effect 
of FDI t and FDI t− 1 on domestic investment in LDCs is 0.482 and significant at the 5% level. The next two 
sums are 0.767 and 1.116, both significant at the 1% level. A 1% increase in inward FDI as a share of 
GDP is associated with a 0.767% increase in domestic investment as a share of GDP over 3 years, and a 
1.116% increase over 4 years holding other things constant. The results are statistically and 
economically meaningful. It suggests that over time, domestic investment in LDCs increases on a one-
to-one basis with an increase in inward FDI. In addition, a Wald test of coefficient constraint is applied. 
The null hypothesis of the Wald test is that the sum of coefficients on all FDI variables is zero, 
indicating that the cumulative effect of FDI on host countries’ domestic investment is neutral. Based on 
test statistics, for DCs, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. For LDCs, the null hypothesis is rejected at 
the 5% significance level. Together with the positive number, it confirms a crowding-in effect of inward 
FDI over time. The result has important policy implications for LDCs. A cumulative positive effect in 
LDCs provides support for policies which encourage inward FDI, especially inward FDI that leads to the 
long-run establishment of MNCs in LDCs. 
V. Conclusion 
Focusing on FDI and the domestic investment in the host country, our study looks at not only 
contemporaneous FDI but also FDI in previous periods in order to catch the cumulative response. 
Interestingly, using data for 50 countries from 1970 to 2004, we find that contemporaneous FDI 
crowds out domestic investment in DCs, while having a neutral effect in LDCs. Over time, an increase in 
inward FDI neither increases nor decreases domestic investment in DCs. In other words, the cumulative 
effect of FDI in DCs is neutral. However, in LDCs, the cumulative effect is positive and significant, 
suggesting that inward FDI helps to increase domestic investment in LDCs over time. Governments face 
possible policy tradeoffs when encouraging the activities of MNCs if the crowding-out effect of FDI is 
persistent. The empirical findings in our study suggest that FDI could be beneficial to domestic 
investment, especially in LDCs, because of the cumulative crowding-in effect. Government policies 
should aim to help domestic firms improve efficiency so that the positive effect of FDI can occur within 
a relatively short period of time after the entry of MNCs. However, exactly what types of government 
policies would make inward FDI contribute most to the domestic economy is beyond the scope of this 
article and might be an interesting issue for further exploration. 
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Appendix: Theoretical Model 
In this section, we provide a theoretical model that follows closely Barrios et al. (2005). 
In the domestic country, a representative consumer's utility depends on his/her consumption of 
manufacturing product (M) and agricultural product (A). To be more specific, the utility function of the 
representative consumer is as follows: 
𝑉𝑉 =  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝛼𝛼  𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴1−𝛼𝛼 , 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1 (A1) 
 
where the manufacturing sector is a constant-elasticity-substitution aggregate of individual varieties or  
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  =  �∑ χ𝑖𝑖(𝜎𝜎−1)/𝜎𝜎)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �𝜎𝜎/(𝜎𝜎−1) with σ > 1; xi represents the consumption for manufacturing product i; CA is the 
consumption of agricultural product. 
The agricultural sector experiences perfect competition and uses capital K as the only factor of 
production. The manufacturing sector consists of two industries–the upstream industry and the 
downstream industry. Both the upstream and the downstream industries are monopolistic 
competitive. The upstream industry uses only K to produce intermediate inputs (U). Each downstream 
industry firm then uses K and the intermediate inputs, U, to produce a final manufacturing product. 
Solving the problem of consumer utility maximization generates the demand function for each 
individual manufacturing product 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−𝜎𝜎 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝜎𝜎−1  (A2) 
where 
𝐺𝐺 = �� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖1−𝜎𝜎
𝑖𝑖
�)1/(1−𝜚𝜚). 
 which is the price index in the downstream industry in the manufacturing sector; G represents 
consumer's income spent on manufacturing products; and pi is the price for manufacturing product i. 
The price index indicates that an increase in the number of firms in the downstream industry will 
decrease the price level for the manufacturing product, namely the competition effect. 
Suppose the price for factor K is r and the price index for upstream intermediate inputs is Q, then the 
cost function for each downstream industry firm in the manufacturing sector is: 
𝐶𝐶(𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖  =  𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺1−𝜃𝜃 (𝜆𝜆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  + 𝑓𝑓) 𝜆𝜆 > 0,𝑓𝑓 > 0 (A3) 
where  
𝑄𝑄 = �� 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗1−𝜀𝜀
𝑗𝑗
�
1/(1−𝜀𝜀)
 
with ϵ > 1; and qj represents the price for each individual upstream intermediate input. θ is the share of 
aggregate intermediate inputs in the production of each final manufacturing product. 
Equation A3 shows that an increase in the number of firms in the upstream industry would decrease 
the production cost for downstream firms. 
Profit maximization, or equivalently marginal revenue equals marginal cost, leads to the following 
expression for price of each manufacturing product i: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎−1  𝜆𝜆𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃  𝐺𝐺1−𝜃𝜃  (A4) 
From Equations A3 and A4, we can see that price of the downstream manufacturing product is set as a 
mark-up over the marginal cost of production. Since the downstream industry in the manufacturing 
sector is monopolistic competitive, at equilibrium each individual firm obtains zero economic profit. 
Therefore, the equilibrium production level for individual firm i in the downstream industry in the 
manufacturing sector is: 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  =  (𝜎𝜎−1)𝑓𝑓𝜆𝜆  (A5) 
Now, suppose the cost function for firm j in the upstream industry in the manufacturing sector is: 
𝐶𝐶(𝑈𝑈)𝑗𝑗 =   𝐺𝐺�𝜔𝜔𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 + 𝜙𝜙�𝜔𝜔 > 0,𝜙𝜙 > 0 (A6) 
where uj is the production level for firm j. Then the price for an upstream intermediate input charged 
by firm j is: 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗  = 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀−1  𝐺𝐺𝜔𝜔 (A7) 
At equilibrium, firm j should break even. So, the equilibrium level of production for firm jin the 
upstream industry is: 
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 = (𝜀𝜀−1)𝜙𝜙𝜔𝜔   (A8) 
For simplicity, MNCs are assumed to enter only the downstream industry in the manufacturing sector 
and have the same cost function as domestic firms. The number of MNCs is nm , the number of 
domestic firms in the downstream industry is nd and the number of upstream firms is nu . In addition, 
the entry of each multinational firm brings in the host country Ω unit of K. This reflects the idea that 
FDI can transfer physical capital into the host country. The equilibrium condition in the factor K market 
gives: (𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 + 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚) 𝜗𝜗𝐶𝐶(𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖𝜗𝜗𝜗𝜗 + 𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢  𝜗𝜗𝐶𝐶(𝑈𝑈)𝜗𝜗𝜗𝜗 + 𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴 = 𝐾𝐾 + Ω𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚  (A9) 
where KA represents the capital factor used in the agricultural sector; K represents the total 
endowment of the factor in the domestic country. Based on Equations A3, A6 and equilibrium values 
provided above, Equation A9 can be rewritten as the following: (𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 + 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚) �𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢1/(1−𝜀𝜀) 𝜀𝜀𝜔𝜔𝜀𝜀−1�𝜃𝜃 𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝜙𝜙𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢 = 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾 + Ω𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚  (A10) 
At equilibrium in the manufacturing sector, quantity demanded for the intermediate inputs should be 
equal to the quantity supplied, which indicates: (𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 + 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚) �𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢1/(1−𝜀𝜀)�𝜃𝜃 � 𝜀𝜀𝜔𝜔𝜀𝜀−1�𝜃𝜃−1 𝜃𝜃𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 = 𝜙𝜙(𝜀𝜀−1)𝜔𝜔  (A11) 
Equations A10 and A11 are nonlinear and nm and nd cannot be solved explicitly. However, given certain 
parameter values, the relationship between nm and nd can be shown in Fig. A1.12 
Fig. A1. Numerical simulation of the relationship between nm and nd 
 List of countries included in the sample 
Argentina Denmark Iran Netherlands South Africa 
Australia Ecuador Ireland Nigeria Spain 
Austria Egypt Israel Norway Sweden 
Belgium Finland Italy Pakistan Switzerland 
Brazil France Japan Philippines Thailand 
Canada Germany Kazakhstan Poland Turkey 
Chile Greece Korea Portugal United Kingdom 
China, P.R.: Mainland Hungary Malaysia Russia United States 
Colombia India Mexico Saudi Arabia Venezuela 
Czech Republic Indonesia Morocco Singapore Vietnam 
Figure A1 illustrates that as the number of MNCs (nm ) increases in the host country, the number of 
domestic firms (nd ) goes down first and then goes up. As mentioned above in Equation A2, an increase 
in the number of firms in the downstream industry will decrease the price level for the manufacturing 
product. This can reduce the number of domestic firms. However, according to Equation A3, possible 
backward linkage effect can increase the number of upstream firms and then reduce the cost of 
production in the downstream industry. Furthermore, in this model, the entry of MNCs is accompanied 
by an addition of the factor of production, K. Such an addition decreases the price of K and also 
reduces the cost of production for domestic firms, holding other things constant. The backward 
linkage, lower cost of production, and possibly other spillover effect in terms of technology transfer all 
can lead to an increased number of domestic firms. Such a positive impact could overcome the 
negative competition effect. As a result, we observe a positive relationship 
between nd and nm as nm gets larger in Fig. A1. 
Notes 
1 The phrases ‘crowding-in’ and ‘crowding-out’ are used in the existing empirical literature and the United 
Nations (1999) to represent the relationship between inward FDI and domestic investment. To be 
consistent with the literature, we use these same phrases throughout our article. 
2 In Markusen and Venables (1999), foreign firms and domestic firms cannot coexist in the same industries. 
3 A better proxy for the existing number of foreign firms is the FDI stock at a certain point of time, instead of FDI 
flows over a certain period. However, stock values are typically not available for LDCs. Similarly, 
domestic capital stock values are not readily available from different countries. As a result, we use flow 
data. 
4 Two different dependent variables have been used in previous studies of FDI and host country's domestic 
investment: one is the total investment in the host country (Agosin and Mayer, 2000) and the other is 
the domestic investment (Agrawal, 2000). The choice of dependent variable does not change our results 
qualitatively. It only changes the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on FDI. If we choose total 
investment to be the dependent variable, then crowding-in will require β 1 > 1; crowding-out will 
indicate β1 < 1. 
5 The lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term financing needs of the private 
sector. For countries without information on the lending rate, the Treasury bill rate is used. 
6 The coefficient of variation = 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸/?̅?𝐸, where sx is the Standard Deviation (SD) of a sample and ?̅?𝜒 is the sample 
mean. 
7 The correlation between actual FDI and the instrumented FDI is 0.73. 
8 If MNCs enter the intermediate inputs industries, it can encourage more domestic firms in the final product 
industry given lower prices of the intermediate inputs. This is an example of forward linkages. 
9 Our empirical specification does not distinguish between the linkage effects and other positive spillover effects 
of inward FDI. This is not the emphasis of our article, but maybe a useful future extension. 
10 The t-statistic is constructed as 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2−0
�var(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1) + var(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2) + 2cov(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1,   𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2) 
which is to test whether the sum of the coefficients is significantly different from zero. 
11 Dividing the whole sample into high-income and middle/low-income groups gives similar results to dividing 
the whole sample into OECD and non-OECD countries. 
12 Parameter values used in Fig. A1 are from Barrios et al. (2005). 
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